Files
ragflow/agent/sandbox/executor_manager/services/security.py
Zhichang Yu fd11aca8e5 feat: Implement pluggable multi-provider sandbox architecture (#12820)
## Summary

Implement a flexible sandbox provider system supporting both
self-managed (Docker) and SaaS (Aliyun Code Interpreter) backends for
secure code execution in agent workflows.

**Key Changes:**
-  Aliyun Code Interpreter provider using official
`agentrun-sdk>=0.0.16`
-  Self-managed provider with gVisor (runsc) security
-  Arguments parameter support for dynamic code execution
-  Database-only configuration (removed fallback logic)
-  Configuration scripts for quick setup

Issue #12479

## Features

### 🔌 Provider Abstraction Layer

**1. Self-Managed Provider** (`agent/sandbox/providers/self_managed.py`)
- Wraps existing executor_manager HTTP API
- gVisor (runsc) for secure container isolation
- Configurable pool size, timeout, retry logic
- Languages: Python, Node.js, JavaScript
- ⚠️ **Requires**: gVisor installation, Docker, base images

**2. Aliyun Code Interpreter**
(`agent/sandbox/providers/aliyun_codeinterpreter.py`)
- SaaS integration using official agentrun-sdk
- Serverless microVM execution with auto-authentication
- Hard timeout: 30 seconds max
- Credentials: `AGENTRUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AGENTRUN_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET`,
`AGENTRUN_ACCOUNT_ID`, `AGENTRUN_REGION`
- Automatically wraps code to call `main()` function

**3. E2B Provider** (`agent/sandbox/providers/e2b.py`)
- Placeholder for future integration

### ⚙️ Configuration System

- `conf/system_settings.json`: Default provider =
`aliyun_codeinterpreter`
- `agent/sandbox/client.py`: Enforces database-only configuration
- Admin UI: `/admin/sandbox-settings`
- Configuration validation via `validate_config()` method
- Health checks for all providers

### 🎯 Key Capabilities

**Arguments Parameter Support:**
All providers support passing arguments to `main()` function:
```python
# User code
def main(name: str, count: int) -> dict:
    return {"message": f"Hello {name}!" * count}

# Executed with: arguments={"name": "World", "count": 3}
# Result: {"message": "Hello World!Hello World!Hello World!"}
```

**Self-Describing Providers:**
Each provider implements `get_config_schema()` returning form
configuration for Admin UI

**Error Handling:**
Structured `ExecutionResult` with stdout, stderr, exit_code,
execution_time

## Configuration Scripts

Two scripts for quick Aliyun sandbox setup:

**Shell Script (requires jq):**
```bash
source scripts/configure_aliyun_sandbox.sh
```

**Python Script (interactive):**
```bash
python3 scripts/configure_aliyun_sandbox.py
```

## Testing

```bash
# Unit tests
uv run pytest agent/sandbox/tests/test_providers.py -v

# Aliyun provider tests
uv run pytest agent/sandbox/tests/test_aliyun_codeinterpreter.py -v

# Integration tests (requires credentials)
uv run pytest agent/sandbox/tests/test_aliyun_codeinterpreter_integration.py -v

# Quick SDK validation
python3 agent/sandbox/tests/verify_sdk.py
```

**Test Coverage:**
- 30 unit tests for provider abstraction
- Provider-specific tests for Aliyun
- Integration tests with real API
- Security tests for executor_manager

## Documentation

- `docs/develop/sandbox_spec.md` - Complete architecture specification
- `agent/sandbox/tests/MIGRATION_GUIDE.md` - Migration from legacy
sandbox
- `agent/sandbox/tests/QUICKSTART.md` - Quick start guide
- `agent/sandbox/tests/README.md` - Testing documentation

## Breaking Changes

⚠️ **Migration Required:**

1. **Directory Move**: `sandbox/` → `agent/sandbox/`
   - Update imports: `from sandbox.` → `from agent.sandbox.`

2. **Mandatory Configuration**: 
   - SystemSettings must have `sandbox.provider_type` configured
   - Removed fallback default values
- Configuration must exist in database (from
`conf/system_settings.json`)

3. **Aliyun Credentials**:
   - Requires `AGENTRUN_*` environment variables (not `ALIYUN_*`)
   - `AGENTRUN_ACCOUNT_ID` is now required (Aliyun primary account ID)

4. **Self-Managed Provider**:
   - gVisor (runsc) must be installed for security
   - Install: `go install gvisor.dev/gvisor/runsc@latest`

## Database Schema Changes

```python
# SystemSettings.value: CharField → TextField
api/db/db_models.py: Changed for unlimited config length

# SystemSettingsService.get_by_name(): Fixed query precision
api/db/services/system_settings_service.py: startswith → exact match
```

## Files Changed

### Backend (Python)
- `agent/sandbox/providers/base.py` - SandboxProvider ABC interface
- `agent/sandbox/providers/manager.py` - ProviderManager
- `agent/sandbox/providers/self_managed.py` - Self-managed provider
- `agent/sandbox/providers/aliyun_codeinterpreter.py` - Aliyun provider
- `agent/sandbox/providers/e2b.py` - E2B provider (placeholder)
- `agent/sandbox/client.py` - Unified client (enforces DB-only config)
- `agent/tools/code_exec.py` - Updated to use provider system
- `admin/server/services.py` - SandboxMgr with registry & validation
- `admin/server/routes.py` - 5 sandbox API endpoints
- `conf/system_settings.json` - Default: aliyun_codeinterpreter
- `api/db/db_models.py` - TextField for SystemSettings.value
- `api/db/services/system_settings_service.py` - Exact match query

### Frontend (TypeScript/React)
- `web/src/pages/admin/sandbox-settings.tsx` - Settings UI
- `web/src/services/admin-service.ts` - Sandbox service functions
- `web/src/services/admin.service.d.ts` - Type definitions
- `web/src/utils/api.ts` - Sandbox API endpoints

### Documentation
- `docs/develop/sandbox_spec.md` - Architecture spec
- `agent/sandbox/tests/MIGRATION_GUIDE.md` - Migration guide
- `agent/sandbox/tests/QUICKSTART.md` - Quick start
- `agent/sandbox/tests/README.md` - Testing guide

### Configuration Scripts
- `scripts/configure_aliyun_sandbox.sh` - Shell script (jq)
- `scripts/configure_aliyun_sandbox.py` - Python script

### Tests
- `agent/sandbox/tests/test_providers.py` - 30 unit tests
- `agent/sandbox/tests/test_aliyun_codeinterpreter.py` - Provider tests
- `agent/sandbox/tests/test_aliyun_codeinterpreter_integration.py` -
Integration tests
- `agent/sandbox/tests/verify_sdk.py` - SDK validation

## Architecture

```
Admin UI → Admin API → SandboxMgr → ProviderManager → [SelfManaged|Aliyun|E2B]
                                      ↓
                                  SystemSettings
```

## Usage

### 1. Configure Provider

**Via Admin UI:**
1. Navigate to `/admin/sandbox-settings`
2. Select provider (Aliyun Code Interpreter / Self-Managed)
3. Fill in configuration
4. Click "Test Connection" to verify
5. Click "Save" to apply

**Via Configuration Scripts:**
```bash
# Aliyun provider
export AGENTRUN_ACCESS_KEY_ID="xxx"
export AGENTRUN_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET="yyy"
export AGENTRUN_ACCOUNT_ID="zzz"
export AGENTRUN_REGION="cn-shanghai"
source scripts/configure_aliyun_sandbox.sh
```

### 2. Restart Service

```bash
cd docker
docker compose restart ragflow-server
```

### 3. Execute Code in Agent

```python
from agent.sandbox.client import execute_code

result = execute_code(
    code='def main(name: str) -> dict: return {"message": f"Hello {name}!"}',
    language="python",
    timeout=30,
    arguments={"name": "World"}
)

print(result.stdout)  # {"message": "Hello World!"}
```

## Troubleshooting

### "Container pool is busy" (Self-Managed)
- **Cause**: Pool exhausted (default: 1 container in `.env`)
- **Fix**: Increase `SANDBOX_EXECUTOR_MANAGER_POOL_SIZE` to 5+

### "Sandbox provider type not configured"
- **Cause**: Database missing configuration
- **Fix**: Run config script or set via Admin UI

### "gVisor not found"
- **Cause**: runsc not installed
- **Fix**: `go install gvisor.dev/gvisor/runsc@latest && sudo cp
~/go/bin/runsc /usr/local/bin/`

### Aliyun authentication errors
- **Cause**: Wrong environment variable names
- **Fix**: Use `AGENTRUN_*` prefix (not `ALIYUN_*`)

## Checklist

- [x] All tests passing (30 unit tests + integration tests)
- [x] Documentation updated (spec, migration guide, quickstart)
- [x] Type definitions added (TypeScript)
- [x] Admin UI implemented
- [x] Configuration validation
- [x] Health checks implemented
- [x] Error handling with structured results
- [x] Breaking changes documented
- [x] Configuration scripts created
- [x] gVisor requirements documented

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-28 13:28:21 +08:00

174 lines
7.6 KiB
Python

#
# Copyright 2025 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
#
import ast
from typing import List, Tuple
from core.logger import logger
from models.enums import SupportLanguage
class SecurePythonAnalyzer(ast.NodeVisitor):
"""
An AST-based analyzer for detecting unsafe Python code patterns.
"""
DANGEROUS_IMPORTS = {"os", "subprocess", "sys", "shutil", "socket", "ctypes", "pickle", "threading", "multiprocessing", "asyncio", "http.client", "ftplib", "telnetlib"}
DANGEROUS_CALLS = {
"eval",
"exec",
"open",
"__import__",
"compile",
"input",
"system",
"popen",
"remove",
"rename",
"rmdir",
"chdir",
"chmod",
"chown",
"getattr",
"setattr",
"globals",
"locals",
"shutil.rmtree",
"subprocess.call",
"subprocess.Popen",
"ctypes",
"pickle.load",
"pickle.loads",
"pickle.dump",
"pickle.dumps",
}
def __init__(self):
self.unsafe_items: List[Tuple[str, int]] = []
def visit_Import(self, node: ast.Import):
"""Check for dangerous imports."""
for alias in node.names:
if alias.name.split(".")[0] in self.DANGEROUS_IMPORTS:
self.unsafe_items.append((f"Import: {alias.name}", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_ImportFrom(self, node: ast.ImportFrom):
"""Check for dangerous imports from specific modules."""
if node.module and node.module.split(".")[0] in self.DANGEROUS_IMPORTS:
self.unsafe_items.append((f"From Import: {node.module}", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call):
"""Check for dangerous function calls."""
if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name) and node.func.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append((f"Call: {node.func.id}", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Attribute(self, node: ast.Attribute):
"""Check for dangerous attribute access."""
if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name) and node.value.id in self.DANGEROUS_IMPORTS:
self.unsafe_items.append((f"Attribute Access: {node.value.id}.{node.attr}", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_BinOp(self, node: ast.BinOp):
"""Check for possible unsafe operations like concatenating strings with commands."""
# This could be useful to detect `eval("os." + "system")`
if isinstance(node.left, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.right, ast.Constant):
self.unsafe_items.append(("Possible unsafe string concatenation", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef):
"""Check for dangerous function definitions (e.g., user-defined eval)."""
if node.name in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append((f"Function Definition: {node.name}", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Assign(self, node: ast.Assign):
"""Check for assignments to variables that might lead to dangerous operations."""
for target in node.targets:
if isinstance(target, ast.Name) and target.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append((f"Assignment to dangerous variable: {target.id}", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Lambda(self, node: ast.Lambda):
"""Check for lambda functions with dangerous operations."""
if isinstance(node.body, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.body.func, ast.Name) and node.body.func.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append(("Lambda with dangerous function call", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_ListComp(self, node: ast.ListComp):
"""Check for list comprehensions with dangerous operations."""
# First, visit the generators to check for any issues there
for elem in node.generators:
if isinstance(elem, ast.comprehension):
self.generic_visit(elem)
if isinstance(node.elt, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.elt.func, ast.Name) and node.elt.func.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append(("List comprehension with dangerous function call", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_DictComp(self, node: ast.DictComp):
"""Check for dictionary comprehensions with dangerous operations."""
# Check for dangerous calls in both the key and value expressions of the dictionary comprehension
if isinstance(node.key, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.key.func, ast.Name) and node.key.func.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append(("Dict comprehension with dangerous function call in key", node.lineno))
if isinstance(node.value, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.value.func, ast.Name) and node.value.func.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append(("Dict comprehension with dangerous function call in value", node.lineno))
# Visit other sub-nodes (e.g., the generators in the comprehension)
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_SetComp(self, node: ast.SetComp):
"""Check for set comprehensions with dangerous operations."""
for elt in node.generators:
if isinstance(elt, ast.comprehension):
self.generic_visit(elt)
if isinstance(node.elt, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.elt.func, ast.Name) and node.elt.func.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append(("Set comprehension with dangerous function call", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_Yield(self, node: ast.Yield):
"""Check for yield statements that could be used to produce unsafe values."""
if isinstance(node.value, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.value.func, ast.Name) and node.value.func.id in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
self.unsafe_items.append(("Yield with dangerous function call", node.lineno))
self.generic_visit(node)
def analyze_code_security(code: str, language: SupportLanguage) -> Tuple[bool, List[Tuple[str, int]]]:
"""
Analyze the provided code string and return whether it's safe and why.
:param code: The source code to analyze.
:param language: The programming language of the code.
:return: (is_safe: bool, issues: List of (description, line number))
"""
if language == SupportLanguage.PYTHON:
try:
tree = ast.parse(code)
analyzer = SecurePythonAnalyzer()
analyzer.visit(tree)
return len(analyzer.unsafe_items) == 0, analyzer.unsafe_items
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"[SafeCheck] Python parsing failed: {str(e)}")
return False, [(f"Parsing Error: {str(e)}", -1)]
else:
logger.warning(f"[SafeCheck] Unsupported language for security analysis: {language} — defaulting to SAFE (manual review recommended)")
return True, [(f"Unsupported language for security analysis: {language} — defaulted to SAFE, manual review recommended", -1)]